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LrnoR LAw-LEGALITY OF A TEMPORARY LocKOUT AS A CouNTERMEASURE 
TO A STRIKE-After several months of unsuccessful negotiations on a new con-
tract, a local union of truck drivers, affiliated with the A.F.L. Teamsters Inter-
national Union, struck one of the members of a multi-employer bargaining 
association. The following day the remaining members of the association locked 
out their non-striking employees after advising the union that the action was 
the result of the union's strike against one member of the association, and that 
the employees who had been laid off would be recalled if the union withdrew 
its picket line and ended the strike. The union processed a complaint to the 
National Labor Relations Board, alleging that the members of the association 
who had locked out their employees had coerced and discriminated against their 
employees in violation of §§8(a)(l) and (3) of the amended National Labor 
Relations Act.1 Held, with Member Murdock dissenting, an economic strike 
1 Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. L. 142 (1947) §S(a) and (c), 29 
U.S.C. (1952) §§l58(a) and (c). 
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against one member of a multi-employer association constitutes a threat of strike 
action against the remaining members which is per se the type of economic or 
operative problem at the plants of the non-struck employers which justifies their 
resort to a temporary lockout of employees. Buffalo Linen Supply Co., 109 
N.L.R.B. No. 69 (1954). 
Since the enactment of the original Wagner Act the NLRB has consistently 
held that the NLRA leaves intact the employer's right to discontinue his opera-
tions for any reason whatsoever, provided only that the action is not motivated 
by a desire to interfere with his employees' union activity.2 Furthermore, the 
Board for some time has taken the position that an employer may justify a dis-
continuance of operations when a strike, or threat of strike, causes the danger 
of spoilage of materials,3 a breach of contract with customers,4 or other operative 
difficulties.5 On the other hand, reprisals against employees for their strike activ-
ity have been uniformly held unlawful by the Board even when such activity 
subjects an employer to unusual economic hardships.6 Thus, until the principal 
case, the Board had steadfastly refused to allow an employer lockout prompted 
by bargaining, as opposed to strictly economic considerations. Consequently, 
the holding in the principal case appears on the face of things to be a capitula-
tion by the Board to the views of the Seventh7 and Ninth8 Circuits that a lock-
out, when used as a defensive weapon, is the employer's correlative power to 
the union's power to strike, and is not a violation of the NLRA.9 The Board, 
however, seems reluctant to accept fully the correlative power theory, expressly 
limiting the decision in the principal case to instances of union strike action 
against one member of a multi-employer bargaining association. At first glance 
this decision seems fair. Allowing the use of lockouts in the multi-employer 
situation would tend to prevent the whipsawing of individual members of an 
2 NLRB v. Cape County Milling Co., (8th Cir. 1944) 140 F. (2d) 543; NLRB v. 
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615 (1937). 
s Duluth Bottling Assn., 48 N.L.R.B. 1335 (1943). 
4 Betts Cadillac Olds, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 268 (1951). 
5 International Shoe Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 907 (1951), where union ~truck one out of 
three integrated departments in the same plant; Link-Belt Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 227 (1940), to 
avoid a sitdown strike; Beckerman Shoe Co., 19 N.L.R.B. 820 (1940), to avoid excessive 
wildcat strikes; Brown-McLaren Mfg. Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 984 (1941), to avoid a burden-
some union contract; NLRB v. Lovvorn, (5th Cir. 1949) 172 F. (2d) 293 (1949). 
a NLRB v. National Broadcasting Co., (2d Cir. 1945) 150 F. (2d) 895; NLRB v. 
Star Publishing Co., (9th Cir. 1938) 97 F. (2d) 465. That merely threatening a lockout 
is enough, see NLRB v. Frank Bros., (1st Cir. 1943) 137 F. (2d) 989. If any proscribed 
motive could be found, other facts will not mitigate the violation, NLRB v. Gluek Brewing 
Co., (8th Cir. 1944) 144 F. (2d) 847. 
7 Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. NLRB, (7th Cir. 1951) 190 F. (2d) 576. 
s Leonard v. NLRB, (9th Cir. 1952) 197 F. (2d) 435. 
9 In Leonard v. NLRB, note 8 supra, the court maintained that the prohibition and 
regulation of "strikes and lockouts" in the LMRA [tit. I, §8(d)(4); tit. II, §§203(c), 206, 
208(a)] implies that some lockouts are lawful. The opponents of this view contend that 
these sections are concerned with the existence of lockouts, not their status. 
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employer association by a union,10 would act as a deterrent to strikes by large 
unions against individual members of an association, 11 and would be in keeping 
with the existence of the multi-employer unit.12 In addition, the allowance of 
such lockouts would be consistent with congressional intent to limit the bargain-
ing advantages which labor was thought to have had under the original Wagner 
Act. On the other hand these arguments ignore several practical considerations.13 
The genesis of employer organization is in large part a defensive response by 
the small employer to the problem of dealing with large and powerful unions.14 
Giving the employer association the weapon of the defensive lockout may deter 
unions in the future from entering into such bargaining relationships,15 and 
may be an impetus to the discontinuance of such relationship now existing,16 
for a union, whose strike action against the employer bargaining individually 
would be protected against lockouts, will not be inclined to look favorably on 
multi-employer bargaining in which the same strike against the same employer, 
now bargaining as a member of an association, would not be protected against 
lockouts. Furthermore, since the burden of proof of employer anti-union motive 
is on the general counsel,17 and since such former evidence of anti-union motive 
as the timing of the lockout, 18 past lay-off practices by the employer, 19 or anti-
union statements20 are clearly irrelevant or inadmissible, the difficulties of proof 
of anti-union motivation for the lockout are so great as to furnish an employer 
association with an effective "union busting" weapon.21 Particularly is this true 
10 3 STAN. L. REv. 510 (1951). Query whether such whipsawing could not be offset 
by establishment of a fund for the purpose of aiding employer members of the association 
who are struck by the union. 
11 65 HAnv. L. REv. 353 (1951). 
12 20 Umv. Cm. L. REv. 299 (1953). 
13 Most authors have assumed that the protection of multi-employer bargaining is an 
end in itself. See Petro, "The NLRB on Lockouts," 3 LAB. L.J. 659 (1952). But in many 
instances the "picking-off" of single members of employer associations serves an excellent 
purpose, since it may be the recalcitrant, anti-union employer member who has brought 
about the impasse in bargaining and who is chosen for the union attack. 
HFRBmIN, THE TAFT-HARTLEY Acrr AND MULTI-EMPLOYER BARGAINING 4 (1948). 
15 Since a history of multi-employer bargaining is almost always essential to the 
recognition of a multi-employer bargaining unit by the Board, there is no compulsion on a 
union to enter such a bargaining relationship in the original instance. NLRB, ELEVENTH 
ANNUAL REPORT 26 (1946). 
16 Fairness requires that a union be allowed to discontinue multi-employer bargaining 
at will, since the employer may do so, and since the act makes the appropriate unit a rep-
resentation rather than a bargaining question. However, the Board has refused to pass 
directly on the question of union withdrawal power. See Continental Baking Co., 99 
N.L.R.B. 777 (1952). 
11 Abe A. Bochner, 85 N.L.R.B. 633 (1949). 
18 NLRB v. Somerset Classics, Inc., (2d Cir. 1952) 193 F. (2d) 613. 
19 American Radiator Co., 7 N.L.R.B. 1127 (1938). 
20 Section 8(c) makes employer anti-union statements non-admissible as evidence of 
unfair labor practices. _ 
21 In practice the distinction between bargaining motivation and anti-union motivation 
is too tenuous to exist in many situations. In many instances, continued economic success 
at the bargaining table is a condition of the union's existence, and sometimes it is the 
employer association which is the stronger of the two. 
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if the language of the principal case to the effect that a strike against one mem-
ber of the association per se justifies a lockout by the other members means that 
the union is precluded from introducing any evidence of anti-union motivation 
for the lockout.22 Finally, it is difficult to believe that a Congress which so 
extensively modified and spelled out the rights of both management and labor 
by the passage of the Labor Management Relations Act would not have specifi-
cally excluded defensive lockouts in the multi-employer situation from the broad 
coverage of §§8(a)(l) and (3) of title I if it had intended them to be so 
excluded. 
John F. Dodge, Jr., S.Ed. 
22 See the dissenting opinion of Member Murdock in the principal case. 
